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Abstract
Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be in-
commensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. Accord-
ing to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents
are irrational. Experience shows, however, that incomplete preferences are ubiquitous
in ordinary life. In this paper, we aim to do two things: () show that there is a good
case for revising decision theory so as to allow it to apply non-vacuously to agents with
incomplete preferences, and () to identify one substantive criterion that any such
non-standard decision theory must obey. Our criterion, Competitiveness, is a weaker
version of a dominance principle. Despite its modesty, Competitiveness is incompati-
ble with prospectism, a recently developed decision theory for agents with incomplete
preferences.We spend theﬁnal part of the paper showingwhyCompetitiveness should
be retained, and prospectism rejected.
Keywords: Decision theory, incommensurate value, practical reason, incomplete prefer-
ences, dominance.
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
 e demands of decision theory
There is a growing popular literature in psychology and behavioural economics examining
the nature of choice.¹ In such literature, one often reads claims to the eﬀect that humans
do not conform to the axioms of decision theory, and thus that we are irrational. Conse-
quently, it is claimed, our economic theories should be revised so as to better predict and
explain the behaviour of genuinely human, irrational agents, rather than designed to pre-
dict behaviour of the ﬁctional homo economicus.²
No doubt, humans are frequently irrational, and no doubt there are serious problems
with the use of decision theory as a tool to predict our behaviour. But the line of thought
glossed above is too quick to concede that decision theory provides an adequate norma-
tive account of rationality itself. Orthodox versions of decision theory, founded upon the
idea of maximizing expected utility, are extremely demanding, or contain signiﬁcant ide-
alizations. For these sorts of reasons, we might well suspect that decision theory is not an
adequate theory of rationality. There are a number of ways in which this complaint could
be made, and in this paper we focus on only one of them: the demand that rational agents
have a complete and transitive preference ordering over possible actions. This premiss is
in tension with the thought that a rational agent might regard two states of aﬀairs as in-
commensurate in value. Agents who hold states of aﬀairs to be incommensurate will have
incomplete preferences. That is, they will lack an all things considered preference for one
state over the other, but they will also fail to hold the two states to be equally preferable. It
has long been known that decision theory’s premisses are implausible for this reason, but
little has been done to address the concern.³
To brieﬂy illustrate what it is to hold two things to be incommensurate in value, sup-
pose you are confrontedwith a terrible dilemma. Both yourmother and father are inmortal
danger. Yourmother is attending to her garden, located in a valley, and is endangered by an
imminent ﬂood. Your father is out gathering mushrooms in the foothills of nearby moun-
tains, and is threatened by an impending avalanche. You have time to save one or the other,
but not both. Whomever you do not save will surely die. You are very close to both your
parents, both of whom are of outstanding character, and both are in good health. You have
. E.g. Ariely ; Brafman and Brafman ; Schwartz ; Thaler and Sunstein .
. Ariely is particularly explicit in this regard, see Ariely : xxix–xxx.
. E.g. Broome : –; Savage : .

no preference that one rather than the other live. You know that you will feel the burden
of this decision for the rest of your life.
But there is a complication that youhave just remembered: the governmenthas recently
advertised that it will provide free grief counselling for the bereaved relatives of ﬂood vic-
tims, but no such scheme exists for the bereaved of avalanche victims. Though you would
never express such a callous-sounding preference out loud, if your mother died, you would
prefer to receive the free grief counselling than not. But even so: this consideration is not
enough to help you knowingly to choose between your mother and your father. The thought
that, by saving your father, you will secure free counselling for your mother’s death in no
way convinces you that saving your father is the right thing to do. You would still have no
preference to save one or the other.
This complication is important, because it suggests that you don’t take your father’s
survival and your mother’s survival to be equally desirable. To make this point clear, we
need to give a more general characterisation of the value relations that two things, A and
B, can possibly stand in. The obvious possibilities are:
• A > B (A is better than B)
• B > A (B is better than A)
• A  B (A and B are equal in value)
The relation of being equal in value can be deﬁned in terms of the better than relation.⁴
Two things, A and B are equal in value if, and only if:
it is not the case that A > B; it is not the case that B > A; and for all things C,
(C > A iﬀ C > B), and (A > C iﬀ B > C).
Is it possible for two things to stand in any other value relation than these? Certainly:
two things may be incommensurate in value if none of the other comparative value relations
hold between them.The above example appears to be one such case. Youdonot value saving
your father more than saving your mother (Save Father Save Mother). You do not value
saving your mother more than saving your father (SaveMother Save Father). But do you
value these things equally? If so, then a very small improvement (a mild ‘sweetening’) in
one option should render it superior to the other. Saving your father, while receiving grief
. Here we follow, and revise slightly, Broome : .

counselling for the death of your mother (call this ‘Save Father+’), is a better outcome than
saving your father, without receiving grief counselling (Save Father+ > Save Father). So if
the two original options were equally good, we would ﬁnd that the grief counselling is a
‘tie-breaker’. We would be able to reason as follows:
Save Father  Save Mother
Save Father+ > Save Father
) Save Father+ > Save Mother
That is, from the assumption that you value the initial alternatives equally, it follows that
you are rationally required to save your father, in order to obtain the free grief counselling.
This is – for at least some agents – an implausible conclusion. Rather, it appears that we
have good reason to reject the ﬁrst premiss: Saving your father and saving your mother are
not equal in value, but are incommensurate.⁵
Standard decision theory uses the preferences of individuals to determine the relevant
value of outcomes. An assumption of standard decision theory is that rational agents have
preferences over all outcomes that stand in a complete and transitive total ordering. But
agents who take two things to be of incommensurate value violate these conditions. More
precisely, agents who regard two states as incommensurate in value have incomplete pref-
erences. For such agents, for some three outcomes x, y, z, the agent has no preference be-
tween x and y, has no preference between y and z, and yet prefers x to z. In this case: x =
Save Father+; y = Save Mother; z = Save Father.
When an agent has incomplete preferences, standard decision theory is silent – it gives
no advice. This is because, to handle decisions under uncertainty, decision theory uses ex-
pected utility calculations. Constructing a utility function on which to base such calcula-
tions requires a complete preference ordering. Incomplete preferences block construction
of the utility function, and thereby prevent us from deriving any recommendations from
the theory. (Without going into the technicalities of how utility functions are constructed
(e.g. Debreu ), it is easy enough to see why a utility function is incompatible with in-
commensurate value. A utility function assigns to every outcome a real number. The real
. Some prefer to use the term ‘incomparability’ to describe this value relation. See, e.g. Hsieh . Ruth Chang
() claims that, in addition to the possibility of incomparability – understood as the absence of any com-
parative relation – there is also the possibility of the relation of ‘parity’, which is a fourth comparative relation
that might be described as ‘rough equality’. In this paper, we ignore the alleged distinction between parity
and incomparability, and assume that they can be treated identically.

numbers stand in a total ordering – there are no incommensurabilities between real num-
bers! Consequently, utilities cannot represent incommensurabilities.)
To illustrate the plausibility of there being incommensurate value,wehave appealed to a
decision that involved a very weighty, terrible decision. But in trivial choices, also, it seems
that we can have incomplete preferences without being irrational. Shall we go bowling or
have a picnic? It’s a toss-up – they both have their attractions. Now you discover that the
tram fare to the picnic has increased by ten cents. Paying ten cents extra for a picnic is worse
than not, though onlymarginally. But does this constitute a tie-breaker? Are you rationally
required to go bowling? For some agents, it is plausible that they hold the attitudes that
the cheaper picnic is preferable to the dearer one, but they have no preference between the
picnic and bowling, whether or not the picnic is  cents more or less costly. This does not
strike us as strong grounds to deem such agents irrational.⁶
By appeal to the plausibility of such examples as this, we believe we can mount an ar-
gument that decision theory ought to be reformed. It can be rational to hold two goods
to be incommensurate in value. Incommensurability would require us to have incomplete
preferences. Therefore it can be rational to have incomplete preferences.
We also endorse a second argument, which relies less upon intuitions about incom-
mensurate value, and instead on a plausible claim about our psychology: viz, that we are
in some sense ﬁnite agents. For instance, we can only perform a ﬁnite number of compu-
tations in our lifetimes; and we can only hold a ﬁnite number of things in our mind at the
one time. There are inﬁnitely many possible outcomes of our actions, however, and so the
requirement of completeness appears to require that we have preferences over inﬁnitely
many states of aﬀairs. Maintaining coherence between all these preferences appears to re-
quire enormous – perhaps inﬁnite – computational power. Thus decision theory demands
the impossible of us. Because decision theory is supposed to have normative force for ﬁnite
agents, and ought implies can, decision theory must be reformed.
Much more could be done to elaborate and defend this second argument, but we don’t
expect that doing so will persuade the advocate of orthodox decision theory.⁷ Rather, more
. A terminological note: one might want to refer to an agent who lacks a preference between choices in trivial
cases, such as the example above, as ‘indiﬀerent’. Standardly, however, decision theorists use the term ‘in-
diﬀerence’ to refer to the state of holding two things to be equally preferable. As we hope the above cases
illustrate, these two varieties of ‘indiﬀerence’ are crucially diﬀerent, and we will – with one exception – avoid
the term to minimize confusion.
. For those seeking further persuasion, Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (: ) argue that

is likely to be achieved by attempting to establish that an alternative decision theory can be
developed, and thereby showingwhat advantages anddisadvantages accrue to eachmethod
of formally stating the normative requirements of decision-making. So we propose to set
aside the explicit advocacy of non-standard decision theory, and instead spend the rest of
this paper attempting to showwhat an adequate decision theorymight look like, for agents
with incomplete preferences.
 Towards a decision theory for agents with incomplete
preferences
There are two principal problems that will confront anyone attempting to devise a theory
of decision for agents with incomplete preferences.
Decision under uncertainty. For any given action that an agent may perform, the agent
is typically uncertain what the outcome will be. Given this, we cannot simply say that it
is rational to act in the way that will bring about the best outcome, for agents typically
cannot know which action that is. The standard way to explain rational decision-making
under uncertainty is to use expected utility. We associate with each possible outcome a car-
dinal measure of its desirability: its utility. Also associated with each outcome is the agent’s
subjective probability that the outcomewill occur, conditional on having performed a given
action. Rational action then, involves taking the action whose outcomes have the greatest
probability-weighted utility.
As mentioned above, however, in order to ascribe to an agent a utility function, stan-
dard techniques require a complete preference ranking. Without a utility function, we can-
not associate with each decision an expected utility. So if we hope to give an adequate the-
ory of rational choice under uncertainty, we will need to ﬁnd some novel way of ranking
available actions.
There are some decision rules which do not require probabilities in order to be applied.
Maximin, for instance, advises the agent to take the action whose worst outcome is best,
relative to the worst outcome of all other actions. This extremely pessimistic decision rule
Bayesian conditionalisation is computationally intractable, and therefore not possible for humans. Simon
(: ) suggests a similar connection aswe do between human cognitive limitations and the normativity
of rational choice theory.

is mirrored by maximax, which decides based upon the most optimistic assessment of all
available actions. Both rules are absurd in their extremism. Moreover, for many realistic
decisions, it is plausible that the worst possible outcome (or best possible outcome) is iden-
tical for all available actions. Whatever your greatest fear (or wish), it is possible that it will
come about, no matter what you do. This suggests that maximin and maximax will end up
saying that all available actions are permissible. Hardly a satisfying result.
Consequently, it would be very desirable to develop a method that retains some of the
virtues of expected utility theory, but which does not require utilities.
Serial decision making The second problem that we will encounter concerns diachronic
rationality – achieving rationally acceptable outcomes over a series of decisions. This prob-
lem arises even in cases of decision under certainty.
Suppose an agent has the following preferences:
A  B (no preference)
A  B+
B+ > B (strict preference)
It is very plausible to think that, in decisions under certainty, an agent is rationally
required to select a maximal option. That is: the agent must choose an option that is not
worse than any other option. Suppose there is no other rule governing rational choice. The
following series of choices, then, is permissible. Suppose the agent starts with A, and is
oﬀered the option to swap to B:
. fA,Bg 7! B
. fB,B+g 7! B+
. fA,B+g 7! A
. fA,Bg 7! B
. …
The agent starts by choosing B, trades up to B+, swaps to A, and then swaps back to
B. Note that on the second trade, the agent is rationally required to accept B+ rather than
B. If we make some mild assumptions about the psychology of our agent, we can suppose

that the agent would also be willing to pay a very small sum for this trade – say ten cents.⁸
But now, if we repeat the cycle of trades, including this small payment, the agent will keep
paying out more and more money, while merely cycling through the options B, B+, A.
In short, agents with incomplete preferences are vulnerable to money-pumps. That
said, diachronic rationality is a challenge for many theories of rational choice, and it might
be that the sorts of measures proposed to assist agents with complete preferences to avoid
money-pumps can be adapted to agents with incomplete preferences.⁹ Partly for this rea-
son, and partly because it is a large topic in its own right, we propose to ignore the second
problem in this paper.
Finally, our project is modest in a further respect: we do not go so far as to establish
a particular decision theory that we believe will satisfactorily address the problem of deci-
sion under uncertainty. Rather: we try to establish a criterion that any adequate decision
theory must satisfy. Our criterion is a close cousin of a dominance principle, and we call it
Competitiveness.
 Competitiveness
One of the least controversial principles of rational choice is Dominance. Here is how it is
introduced in a classic paper by Nozick ().
Dominance Principle: If there is a partition of states of the world such that rel-
ative to it, action alpha weakly dominates action beta, then alpha should be
performed rather than beta.
Action alphaweakly dominates action beta for person P iﬀ, for each state of the
world, P either prefers the consequence of alpha to the consequence of beta, or
. See Mandler :  for formal characterisation of the necessary assumptions.
. In particular, it has been suggested that agents who experience preference reversals will need to be capable
of making and committing to plans in order to avoidmoney pumps. Perhaps such resoluteness will also allow
agents with incomplete preferences to avoid money pumps. See McClennen () or Bratman () for
a discussion of such views of rational agency. Alternatively, perhaps backward-looking agents that consider
their past decisions when making their current ones will be able to avoid money pumps. See Mandler ()
for a discussion.
A referee has pointed out to us that a parallel money-pump concern has been raised for defenders of
imprecise credences (Elga ; White ). To that end, the defender of incomplete preferences may be
able to take inspiration from James Joyce’s () responses to those objections.

is indiﬀerent between the two consequences, and for some state of the world,
P prefers the consequence of alpha to the consequence of beta.
As Nozick goes on to show, this principle is too permissive. There are some partitions
of states of the world such that a manifestly irrrational action will be required by the Dom-
inance Principle. Suppose you hear an air-raid siren. You can shelter or ignore it. Fatalisti-
cally, you think: either I’m going to die in the raid, or I won’t. Whichever way things turn
out, I would prefer to spend less time in an uncomfortable shelter, so I will ignore the warn-
ing. This reasoning appeals to dominance, but ignores the fact that the probability of dying
is much lower if you shelter. There is a probabilistic dependency between the action you
choose and the state of the world, at least on the death–survival partition.
Formany decision problems, however, it is possible to identify a partition such that the
probability of a given world-state is independent of what action you take. For those deci-
sion problems, relative to those partitions, the Dominance Principle above gives seemingly
impeccable advice. Henceforth, we will be discussing only cases where this probabilistic in-
dependence obtains, so will omit the explicit relativisation to a partition.
Suppose an agent faces a decision problem with the structure illustrated in Table ,
where A+ > A, but the agent holds both A+ and A to be incommensurate with B. According
to Nozick’s Dominance principle, an action alpha is rationally obligatory if, for every way
the world could be, the consequences of alpha are either better than or equal in value to
the consequences of all alternative actions, and for some way the world could be the con-
sequences of alpha are better than the consequences of all alternative actions. Because, in
State Y, the outcome of the two possible actions is incommensurate, Dominance is silent
in this case.
State X State Y
Option  A+ A+
Option  A B
Table : A scenario in which it is tempting to apply Dominance-like reasoning, but strictly
speaking Dominance is silent.
Now consider a diﬀerent principle, which we take to be at least as plausible as Noz-
ick’s original: an action alpha is rationally obligatory if, for every way the world could be,
the consequences of alpha are not worse than the consequences of all alternative actions,
and for some way the world could be the consequences of alpha are better than the con-

sequences of all alternative actions. We suggest that our intuition that the ﬁrst option in
Table  is rationally obligatory is best explained by this principle.
Now this principle appears to build on a simpler, and even more compelling, principle:
that an action is rationally permissible if, for everyway theworld could be, its consequences
are no worse than the consequences of all alternative actions. In such a case, let’s say that
the action is ‘competitive’ and call the principle that competitive actions are rationally per-
missible ‘Competitiveness’.
Competitiveness: If an action alpha is competitive, it is rationally permissible to
perform alpha.
Our variant on Nozick’s dominance principle can now be reformulated as follows:
Strong Competitiveness: If one or more actions are competitive, and other ac-
tions are not competitive, it is rationally required to perform a competitive
action.
Strong Competitiveness explains why option  is the only permissible action in the
above example: it is the only competitive action. But for dialectical purposes in this paper, it
will suﬃce to defend the weaker Competitiveness principle. Any adequate decision theory
for agents with incomplete preferences will respect Competitiveness, we claim. It might be
thought that this is too modest a claim to be of interest. But one of the more promising
recent proposals to reform decision theory, intended precisely to give advice to agents with
incomplete preferences, violates this requirement.
 Hare’s prospectism
Caspar Hare has recently developed two novel extensions to decision theory that promise
to give advice to agents with incomplete preferences (Hare ). Hare argues that both
his proposals have genuine appeal, and he leans towards one called prospectism.¹⁰
The key idea behind prospectism is to make up for the diﬃculty caused by incomplete
preferences by appealing to possible coherent completions of the preferences with which the
. Prospectism is not entirely new. An extremely similar idea has been defended by PaulWeirich (: ), and
Weirich cites a predecessor of the idea due to I. J. Good (). We take our criticisms of Hare’s proposal to
generalize to Weirich’s account also.

agent begins. For our agent with the preferences: B  A+ > A  B, the following are some
coherent completions:
• B  A+ > A
• A+ > A > B
• A+ > A  B
• A+ > B > A
• …
Using these possible completions of an agent’s preferences, we can deﬁne utility functions.
Hare’s prospectism says that an action is rationally permissible if (and only if), according
to some coherent completion of the agent’s preferences, that action has maximal expected
utility (Hare : –).
Note that, in all of these coherent completions, we have to respect the original prefer-
ence for A+ over A, so Awill never have a higher utility than A+. In some completions, how-
ever, A+ will have maximal utility, and in others, B will. Consequently, applying prospec-
tism to a choice under certainty between the above three outcomes, it will be permissible
to choose A+ or B, but impermissible to choose A, because there is no completion of pref-
erences according to which A’s utility is maximal.
. Prospectism and decision under uncertainty
Consider the following case of decision under uncertainty, given by Hare.
Suppose I lack preferences between my getting item A and my getting item B.
Suppose this attitude is insensitive to mild sweetening [hence my preferences
manifest incompleteness]. And suppose we play a kind of game:
Two opaque boxes
You show me items A and B, a dollar, a coin, and two opaque boxes.
You toss the coin and, governed by the toss, place item A in one box
and item B in the other. I don’t see which itemwent where. You toss
the coin again and, governed by the toss, place the dollar inside the
right box. I see that – which leaves me with credence . that things
are like so:

Left box Right box
A B + 
and credence . that things are like so:
Left box Right box
B A + 
Then you invite me to walk away with one of the boxes.
(Hare : –)
It is obvious that we may take the right box. The important question is:must you take the
right box? Is it rationally permissible to take the left box? Because your preferences are
incomplete, standard decision theory is silent on the matter. Hare claims that there are
prima facie ‘powerful’ arguments both for and against the rational permissibility of taking
the left box. In favour of it being permissible to take the left box, Hare argues, ﬁrst: if I were
fully informed – if, e.g. I could look inside the boxes – I would have no preference between
them, and I would think it rationally permissible to take the left box. Knowing thatmy fully
informed, rational self would have this view, it must be at least permissible to defer to my
more informed self.¹¹ Second, I know that I have no preference for the contents of either
box. Where I have no preference between two choices, surely I am rationally permitted to
take either.
Drawing on considerations like these, Hare develops a version of decision theory which
he calls deferentialism, and which delivers the verdict, for cases like this, that it is indeed
permissible to take either box. We ﬁnd many aspects of deferentialism intuitively appeal-
ing, but do not discuss it further in this paper.¹²
. This sort of reasoning has clear echoes of the Reﬂection principle – though it seems less vulnerable to the
sorts of problem cases that have been raised against Reﬂection, given those cases tend to exploit future states
in which the agent is not rational (Christensen ), or is in receipt of very special information that is
inaccessible to others (Elga ). Neither of those sorts of concerns seems relevant here.
A further, indirect, consideration in favour of deferring to the preferences ofmy future self is that this idea
features heavily in Krister Bykvist’s () elegant account of how tomake prudent decisions in anticipation
that one’s future preferences will depend upon one’s present choices.
. Although deferentialism respects Competitiveness, one reservation we have is that it violates Strong Com-
petitiveness. Discussing why, and how this feature might best be redressed, would take us too far aﬁeld,
however.

For the contrary view, that it is impermissible to take the left box,Hare oﬀers two further
arguments. First, ‘there is a consideration of which I am aware that counts in favour of my
taking the right, rather than the left box: I will get a dollar if I take the right box, no dollar if
I take the left box. But there is no consideration of which I am aware that counts in favour
of my taking the left, rather than the right box’ ().
Hare’s second argument for this conclusion ismore complicated, and appeals to an anal-
ogous case, which we simplify as follows:
One opaque box
Based on the toss of a coin, you put either itemAor B in a box, without showing
me which. You then oﬀer me the box and a dollar, or just the box without the
dollar.
In this game, it is rationally required that I take the box plus the dollar. But in its decision-
theoretic structure, this game is extremely similar to Two Opaque Boxes. The decision ta-
bles of the games are given in Tables  and .
A is in right B is in right
Take right A+ B+
Take left B A
Table : Decision Table for Two Opaque Boxes
A is in box B is in box
Take box + dollar A+ B+
Take box A B
Table : Decision Table for One Opaque Box
Take the prospect associatedwith an action to be the possible outcomes thatmight come
about if I take that action, paired with my credences in those outcomes.¹³ In One Opaque
Box,
• The prospect of taking the box and the dollar is: fhA+, 0.5i, hB+, 0.5ig.
. Hare allows that the relevant credenceswill be diﬀerent, depending uponwhether one favours causal decision
theory or evidential decision theory. Thus his defence of prospectism remains neutral on that dispute. For
all the examples discussed in this paper, the dispute between evidentialists and causalists is irrelevant.

• The prospect of taking the box alone is: fhA, 0.5i, hB, 0.5ig.
The evaluation of an action, in standard decision theory, is a function of the prospect of
that action. The utilities for the various outcomes aremultiplied by the probability of those
outcomes to give an expected utility associated with that prospect. In this case, there is no
utility function that can be assigned to the four possible outcomes because of the incom-
pleteness of my preferences. Nonetheless, even in cases like these, wemight think that the
prospects of one’s alternatives determine what one may and may not do. Hare articulates
this claim in a principle:
Prospects Determine Permissibility: Facts about what it is rationally permissible
for me to do are determined by facts about the prospects associated with the
options available to me. (p. )
If we accept this principle, however, then we can argue that we must take the right box
in Two Opaque Boxes, as follows:
() Taking the box and the dollar is rationally required in One Opaque Box.
() The prospects of this game are identical to the prospects of TwoOpaque Boxes. (And
the prospect of taking the right box, in particular, is identical to the prospect of tak-
ing the box and the dollar.)
() Prospects Determine Permissibility.
Therefore:
() Taking the right box is rationally required in Two Opaque Boxes.
Drawing inspiration from this argument, Hare develops the theory we have explained
above: prospectism. Prospectism entails the principle Prospects Determine Permissibility.
Returning to Two Opaque Boxes, it is easy to see why prospectism entails that it is
rationally required to take the right box. In all coherent completions of your preferences,
the utility of A+ will be greater than the utility of A, and the utility of B+ will be greater
than B. The expected utility of each action is given by the following equations.
EU(Right) = 0.5(A+) + 0.5(B+)
EU(Left) = 0.5(A) + 0.5(B)

Accordingly, the expected utility of taking the right boxmust be greater than that of taking
the left box, for all possible completions. So prospectism entails that it is impermissible to
take the left box.
. Dominance reasoning with incommensurate values
Given the strong structural similarity between Two Opaque Boxes and One Opaque Box,
why dowe claim thatwhat is rationally permissible is diﬀerent? Consider the following sort
of rationale that an agent could employ.
In the case of the Two Opaque Boxes, either item A or item B is in the right
box. If item A is in the right box, my two possible choices lead to the outcomes:
A+ and B. I have no preference between these. If item B is in the right box,
my two possible choices lead to the outcomes: B+ and A. I have no preference
between these. So however the world turns out, I have no preference between
the outcome of either action.
In the case ofOneOpaque Box, the situation is diﬀerent. If itemA is in the box,
then there are two possible outcomes (A+ and A) and I prefer one of these. The
preferred outcome will come about if I take the box and the dollar. If item B is
in the box, then again there are two possible outcomes (B+ and B) and I prefer
one of these. The preferred outcome will come about if I take the box and the
dollar. So however the world turns out, I prefer the outcome of taking the box
and dollar over taking the box alone.
In the second case, the sort of reasoning being used is clearly dominance reasoning, as al-
ready explained above.
In Two Opaque boxes, dominance reasoning – strictly understood – gives no advice
because, for eachway theworldmight be, it is not the case that one option is at least as good
as the other. However, as we also argued above, we can weaken the notion of dominance
to give us the principle of Competitiveness. In the case of Two Opaque Boxes, both taking
the right box and taking the left box are competitive. Competitiveness entails, then, that
taking either box is permisible.¹⁴
. The idea of Competitiveness is essentially the thought captured by Hare’s principle of ‘Recognition’ (p. ),
though Hare does not identify how closely it follows the idea of dominance reasoning, extended into the
domain of incomplete preferences.

So prospectism entails that Competitiveness is false. We think this is a considerable
mark against it. Moreover, prospectism implausibly entails that the two decisions in One
Opaque Box and Two Opaque Boxes are, for the purposes of decision theory, identical!
That is, although the decision matrices of these decisions diﬀer, they do not diﬀer in their
prospects. Consequently, prospectism implies that agents who treat these decisions diﬀer-
ently are irrational. Of course, some rational agents might think these two decisions are
identical insofar as rational choice is concerned, but it is very plausible to think that it is
rationally permissible, for an agent with preferences like those described, to treat the de-
cisions diﬀerently.
The committed prospectivist, however, may insist that we are begging the question.
If prospectism is false, then what is wrong with the apparently tempting arguments that
Hare presents for the view?
. e considerations argument
The ﬁrst of Hare’s arguments, in full, is as follows:
There is a consideration of which I am aware that counts in favour ofmy taking
the right, rather than the left box: I will get a dollar if I take the right box,
no dollar if I take the left box. But there is no consideration of which I am
aware that counts in favour of my taking the left, rather than the right box.
So, it is rationally impermissible for me to take the left box. It is rationally
impermissible to do something when I have no reason to do it, and a reason to
do something else. (Hare : )
Setting this out even more explicitly, Hare seems to have the following argument in
mind:
In a diﬀerent context, Amartya Sen (; ) has argued that consequentialists do better to adopt a
‘maximizing’ form of consequentialism, rather than an ‘optimizing’ form. The maximizing consequentialist
merely seeks to bring about outcomes that are noworse than any alternative. The optimizing consequentialist
seeks to bring about an outcome that is at least as good as all alternatives. If there are incommensurate goods,
or there is some other failure of the assumptions of completeness and transitivity in the betterness relation,
then the optimizing goal may be impossible – there may be no outcome that is at least as good as all others –
but the maximizing goal remains viable. The adoption of a rule permitting ‘competitive’ actions as opposed
to a rule permitting only dominant actions complements, in decision theory, Sen’s proposal for ethics more
generally.

() If you have a reason tomake decision X rather than decision Y and no reason tomake
decision Y rather than decision X then you ought to make decision X.
() In TwoOpaque Boxes you have a reason to take the right box rather than the left box
(i.e. your getting a dollar).
() In Two Opaque Boxes you do not have a reason to take the left box rather than the
right box.
Therefore,
() in Two Opaque Boxes you ought to take the right box.
Premiss () does look very appealing. We will call it the Reasons principle, and will not
dispute it. Premises () and () rely upon the notion of having a reason to do one action
rather than another. What exactly does it mean to say, in general, that something is a rea-
son in favour of one action, over another? We claim that, when this concept is examined
carefully, premiss () turns out to be unsupportable.
As a preliminary, let us say that p is a reason in favour of taking action A over action B
just in case (i) for some way the world might be, p will be true if I take A, but false if I take
B, and (ii) p’s being true is in some yet to be deﬁned way better than p’s being false.
Plausibly, p’s being true is better than p’s being false, in the relevant sense, if and only
if I prefer p being true to p being false. However, there are at least two ways of cashing out
this preference:
One obvious hypothesis is that I prefer p being true to p being false if and only if I prefer
any world in which p is the case to any world in which p is not the case. But on that reading,
premise  is false. I do not prefer that I have an additional dollar and A rather than B alone,
nor do I prefer that I have an additional dollar and B rather than A alone. Thus, either way,
it would not be better if I had an additional dollar, and the additional dollar does not thus
provide me with a reason to take the right box rather than the left box.
A secondhypothesis is that I prefer pbeing true to pbeing false if andonly if, other things
being equal, I prefer p being the case to p not being the case. That does seem to correctly
describe the phenomenon in Two Opaque Boxes. Other things being equal, I do prefer it to
be the case that I have an additional dollar than otherwise. But this account of preference is
so weak that it seems inappropriate to use it in this dialectical context, where we are trying
to use it in conjunction with Hare’s Reasons principle to derive a conclusion about what
we ought to do. On this understanding of preference, it follows that I have a reason to take

the right box because, other things being equal, I prefer to have an additional dollar rather
than not. But it is also the case that I know that other things are not equal. Indeed, I know
that I will only obtain the additional dollar at the cost of forgoing a good of great value to
me. So to think that preferences, in this sense, can generate ‘reasons’ that can reliably be
plugged into the Reasons principle is implausible – or at best question-begging.
In general, it is worth reﬂecting that the reason why decision theory adopts maxi-
mal states of aﬀairs as the objects of evaluation is precisely so as to avoid complicated
interaction-eﬀects in the ranking of outcomes. By appealing to the thought that a sub-
maximal state of aﬀairs – your getting a dollar – is a reason, Hare is undermining this
sensible methodological move.
To illustrate the diﬃculties that can arise if we follow Hare in his use of sub-maximal
states of aﬀairs to constitute reasons in this way, consider the following case.
Two Charitable Boxes:
Your house has recently burnt down, containing all your possessions. A
charity has come to your rescue – oﬀering you a  gift voucher for one
of two clothes stores. The ﬁrst, store A, sells suits and the second, store B, sells
casual clothing. You ﬁnd these two options incommensurate. After all, your
work doesn’t require that you wear a suit but you think that if you wore one to
the monthly management meeting it might increase your chances of getting
a promotion. On the other hand, if you get the casual store voucher then you
can be comfortable at home and don’t have to go to the beach in a suit. Rather
than having you simply choose one or the other of the vouchers, the charity
has placed them in two boxes according to a coin toss that you didn’t see. The
boxes have been ﬁlled as follows:
Heads Tails
Right box Store A Store B
Left box Store B Store A
The charity now tells you two extra things: First, they have added a dollar (D) to the
right box. Second, if the coin toss came up heads they added a suit (S) to each box. Your
preferences are as follows:
(A + S + D) > (A + S) > (A + D) > A

(B + S + D) > (B + S) > (B + D) > B
You ﬁnd all outcomes involving A incommensurable with respect to outcomes involving
B, except you very strongly prefer (B + S) to any outcome involving A. After all, this way you
can be comfortable most of the time but still wow your bosses at the monthly meeting so
this outcome is more desirable than any other. So the decision table is now:
Heads Tails
Right box A + S + D B + D
Left box B + S A
It seems that in this case you should take the left box. After all, the left box gives you
have a  chance of an outcome that you vastly prefer to any other outcome.
However, if you allow yourself to consider the reasons as decomposed into: a chance
of getting A; a chance of getting B; a chance of getting S; and the certainty of getting D,
then all the reasons to take the left box (chances of A, B, and S) are also reasons to take the
right box. But there is one reason – the certainty of the dollar – for taking the right box
rather than the left box. Hare’s Reasons principle implies that it is rationally impermissible
to take the left box. But taking the left box is the only rationally permissible decision and
so we have been led astray. Thus, we must reject either Hare’s Reasons principle or the
assumption that the reasons, in Two Charitable Boxes, may be decomposed into chances
of getting A, B, S and D. We recommend the second option.
Similarly, we should reject the assumption that one’s reasons, in TwoOpaqueBoxes, are
decomposable into A, B, and a dollar. Rather, we only have reason to think one’s reasons
can reliably be analysed in terms of the four possible outcomes in the case: A, A+, B, and
B+.
. e argument from analogy
The second argument Hare gives relies upon the analogy between Two Opaque Boxes and
One Opaque Box. In the two cases, the decisions are very similar. In particular, the corre-
sponding prospects are identical. In One Opaque Box it is rationally required that we take
the box and the dollar. If Prospects Determine Permissibility is true, then it is rationally
required to take the right hand box in Two Opaque Boxes.
As we have indicated above, we are dubious about Prospects Determine Permissibility.
We claim that that premiss is false. We have a further complaint, however, which is that

the intuition regarding One Opaque Box does not straightforwardly support prospectism.
Prospectism requires that we ‘take the sugar’ only where our credences are perfectly balanced
between the relevant alternatives. But the intuitive appeal of taking the box and the dollar
in One Opaque Box is surely driven by dominance considerations. As such, the intuition
is insensitive to the credences we have in the diﬀerent possibilities. Consider a variant on
One Opaque Box where we are told that the contents of the box was determined by the roll
of a die. If the die landed , A was placed inside the box. Otherwise, B was placed inside the
box. Now your choice is whether to take the box alone, or the box with a dollar.
Obviously, it is still rationally required that you take the box with the dollar. Onemight
have thought, then, that prospectism would entail that you must take the right box in a
similarly modiﬁed version of Two Opaque Boxes, where if the die landed six, A was placed
in the right hand box, and otherwise B was placed in the right hand box. But this is not so.
The prospects of these two games are not identical in their unsweetened actions:
• One opaque box, using die, take box alone: fhA, 16i, hB, 56ig.
• Two opaque boxes, using die, take left: fhA, 56i, hB, 16ig.
Consequently, prospectism allows that it is permissible to take either the right or the left
box. This is a surprising mismatch between the intuitive justiﬁcation of prospectism and
the details of the theory.¹⁵
We conclude that prospectism is an implausibly radical departure from intuition, and
Hare’s aﬀection for it is insuﬃciently motivated, given it violates a natural extension of
. For those who lack our anti-prospectivist intuitions, but would like to take our advice in distancing them-
selves from Hare’s highly sensitive form of prospectism, the following, non-probabilistic principles might
seem to be a better way to formalise the intuitive idea behind the second argument:
P. If none of the possible outcomes associated with a given action A1 are worse than any of the possible
outcomes associated with any alternative action Ai, then A1 is rationally permissible.
P. If one of the possible outcomes associated with a given action A1 is worse than one of the possible
outcomes associated with an alternative action Ai, and no possible outcomes associated with A1 are
better than the possible outcomes associated with Ai, then A1 is rationally prohibited.
These principles would entail that taking the right box is rationally required in variants of TwoOpaque Boxes
where the credences are not equal. However, these principles would also implausibly entail that no decision
is rationally permissible in some cases (as there will be scenarios where P will imply that all decisions are




We conclude that a satisfactory decision theory will give advice to agents with incomplete
preferences. Such a theory should satisfy Competitiveness. This rules out proposals such
as prospectism. There is also signiﬁcant tension between Competitiveness and any the-
ory that accepts that two decisions are equally desirable if they have the same prospects.¹⁶
While Competitiveness is modest, then, it nevertheless rules out a broad class of possible
theories.
Having met the demands of Competitiveness, there is still more to do. A satisfactory
decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences must also address the problem of
serial decision making so as to avoid money-pumps. Whether such a theory can be given
remains to be seen.
Monash University (Bales, Handﬁeld)
Charles Sturt University (Cohen)
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